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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates contemporary Chinese defence thinking from the point of view of its
strategic culture. Such an undertaking is timely in view of heightened threat perceptions about a
militarily strengthening China. While this paper does not concern itself with addressing such
suspicions directly, it hopes to contribute to informed discussion by refocussing the issue onto a
larger historical and philosophical screen. An identification of the PRC's traditional strategic
thinking in the form of people's war and its philosophical antecedents may not at first appear
relevant to contemporary China's security needs. It is the premise of this paper, however, that
nothing can ever be attempted to be known about China's intentions and actions without such a
survey. Consequently, this paper endeavours to show how the past may still be seen to serve the
current era in terms of cultural-philosophical orientation. 
Chinese Strategic Culture: The Heritage from the Past(1) 
 
1. Introduction 
Strategic culture pertains to a people's distinctive style of dealing with an thinking about the 
problems of national security. The intellectual and 'spiritual' modality of a living strategic 
culture may be found in its strategic philosophy. This is concerned as much with enduring 
principles as it is with distinctive approaches applied to the problem of a nation's security. In 
Chinese strategic philosophy there are enduring elements, such as deterrence and psychological 
warfare, that are applicable across time and across cultures. The Chinese do not have a 
monopoly on these, but they have moulded them into a distinctive Chinese approach, just as the 
19th century European strategists - Clausewitz and Jomini - are distinguished for the skilful 
application of physical force. Hence, the underlying premise of this paper is that modern 
Chinese strategic philosophy owes more to its past than to the borrowings from the modern 
world or from other philosophical traditions. The conscious adoptions or coincidental presence 
of foreign strategic philosophies are not disputed. As Fung Yu-Lan has observed: 'Every 
philosophy has that which is permanent and all philosophies have something in common.' (2) 
Without disputing the presence of the foreign or universal, I will concentrate instead on 
advancing the view that there is a uniquely Chinese approach to strategy and that it remains 
even in an age when China has become a powerful nuclear-armed state. 
By way of background, a brief statement on China's current defence policy is in order. It is a 
policy which rests on the strategic doctrine of people's war under modern conditions, and 
incorporates the specialist variant of local war doctrine, designed to deal with defence 
contingencies of limited scope on China's peripheries. Adopted at the onset of the post-Mao era 
of reform under Deng Xiaoping, people's war under modern conditions (abbreviated in this 
paper to modern people's war) was a development from the people's war doctrine (or 
traditional people's war) of Communist China's founder, Mao Zedong (Tse-tung). Modern 
people's war was a development in that it continued to rely on a victory-denial strategy utilising 
China's large land mass, population, and fighting forces - calculated to deter an invader by 
rendering any hope of conquest futile - but added to these traditional elements the need for 
meeting the 'modern conditions' of late 20th century warfare (of which more will be said later). 
2. The Strategic Problem 
China's strategic philosophy, past and present, may be interpreted to address two essential 
needs. One is inviolability and the other is the attainment of China's 'rightful place under 
heaven' - the closest approximation in Western understanding being 'destiny' or 'proper place'. 
The first, inviolability, has a defensive orientation and the second, 'rightful place', an expansive 
one. They are not opposed but interrelated. Without inviolability, 'rightful place' is difficult to 
attain. Without the 'rightful place', inviolability is not assured - as far as one can be assured of 
the complete security to which inviolability aspires. Such an aspiration, incidentally, should be 
viewed within the Chinese perspective of not courting disappointment but purpose, a moral 
strength encouraged by Chinese philosophers of whom the most influential was Confucius. The 
negative (or defensive) and the positive (or expansive) attributes of Chinese strategic 
philosophy related to the yin-yang concept, which is central to several schools of Chinese 
philosophy, including Daoism. The concept may be explained as follows: 
Yin and Yang are at the root of all things, and together in alternation they are the moving force to our 
world and all its manifestations. Yin is seen as passive, yielding, and nurturing, while Yang is active, 
dominating, and creative. Any circumstance, however intricate, can be described by a string of Yins and 
Yangs. (3). 
In the words of one ancient philosopher: "Movement and Quiescence, in alternation, become 
each the source of the other." (4) The West's idea of positive and negative provides a rather 
poor approximation of yang and yin. Opposition is commonly (but not always) emphasised 
rather than complementarity. (5) Yin-yang may be likened to the two sides of the same coin, 
the sides are opposites of head and tail, but the coin on which they are inscribed is one. A way 
in which the idea of negative-positive and yin-yang are more comfortably associated is the 
example of the definition of peace. It can be defined negatively as an absence of war. Peace can 
also be defined as a positive state of affairs, to which particular characteristics and conditions 
may be affixed. Similarly, with Chinese strategy, there is the desire to prevent something (a war 
of aggression against China), and the desire to achieve something (to become, as Zhou Enlai 
phrased it in 1975 'a powerful, modern socialist state'). 
The defensive orientation was evident since the early imperial period. Historically, China has 
feared invasion from its northern frontier. The Great Wall, more than 2,000 years old, was built 
across 4,500 kilometres of northern China for the purpose of keeping the 'barbarian' armies out. 
If China's strategic orientation was only defensive, however, it would not have demanded 
tribute to the Emperor from the outlying 'barbarian' nationalities, and it would not have 
expanded territorially to the extent that it has. China thought of itself as the 'Middle Kingdom', 
(6) the centre of its universe. It modelled its foreign relations on the Confucian values 
associated with filial piety. With the Chinese emperor at the head, lesser kingdoms were 
expected to show submission in return for Chinese protection. Modern China's identification 
with the Confucian model was evident in the Sino-Vietnamese border war of 1979. Beijing 
made it clear that it wanted to teach the Vietnamese a lesson so "they could not run about as 
much as they desired'. (7) This was a reference, of course, to Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, 
its ousting of the pro-Chinese Khmer Rouge and installation of a pro-Vietnamese government 
in the capital, Phnom Penh. At a deeper level, Vietnam was also 'punished' for challenging 
China's traditional influence in Indochina. Vietnam understood the state of filial play when one 
of its publicists responded: 
Seeing Beijing rise up and threaten to punish Hanoi, public opinion sees the image of the stately Great 
Dragon in its holy wrath recounting the disobedient child's sins, and, in front of the assembled world, 
slapping him hard in the face as an example. The naughty child, trembling with fear, would throw himself 
at the Great Dragon's feet to beg pardon, while the witnesses would advise him never to displease his 
elder again. (8) 
The Sino-Vietnamese war of 1979 illustrated China's endeavours to maintain what was 
perceived to be the proper hierarchy of relations. The PRC's formal incorporation of the 
outlying non-Han nationalities, regarded as being historically a part of China, is also illustrative 
of this practice. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ideology - derived from the modern European 
philosophy of Marxism - is as much concerned with maintaining allegiance to the central 
authority as was Imperial China. Such allegiance, needless to say, has even greater implications 
for the intra-Chinese relations of ruler and ruled, as the measures taken against the pro-
democracy movement of 1989 readily testify. In this respect, it is not without interest that Deng 
was reported to have told a Politburo meeting in April of that year that: "This is not an ordinary 
student movement. . . . All they want is to create chaos under the heavens." (9) 
The above observations are suggestive of an enduring tradition which stresses the achievement 
of one's rightful place under heaven (or the moral universe). The proper cultivation of self, of 
family relations, of social relations, of political relations between sovereign and subject, and of 
international relations, reflect a moral imperative derived from Chinese philosophy and is 
compatible with the modern imperative for China to occupy its rightful place in the 
international order. Such a place is not so much defined in terms of contest of power - for this, 
like the concept of 'superpower', is ideologically bankrupt according to Chinese thinking - but 
in terms of moral power. The PRC, after all, still prides itself as being a member of the Third 
World. It began its international life as the Third World's self-proclaimed leader, no less. 
Moreover, the PRC has always regarded its nuclear weapons as morally sound, not only for 
defence against those who already possessed nuclear weapons, but also, during the Cold war 
era, in breaking the superpower monopoly by becoming a non-aligned nuclear force outside the 
East-West camp. Moreover, the 1993 Chinese nuclear test was a clear signal in the post-Cold 
War era that although 'coalition' forces might be able to freeze nuclear programs in Iraq and 
pressure (ultimately, without success) those in North Korea, they cannot reassert a closed 
nuclear club. Therefore, although Chinese behaviour my display the symptoms of classical 
realist calculations - the power game - the underlying rationale has a stronger affinity to the 
political idealist concern with occupying the moral 'high ground'. This observation is perhaps 
more appropriate to China than to the United States and the former Soviet Union whose own 
ideological (idealist) motivations became subsumed with an overriding concern for the balance 
of physical power. 
China's Communist ideology and traditional behaviour converge when one considers the 
Communist doctrinal interpretation of the nature of war. It views war as an outcome of 
imperialist/hegemonist aggression. Accordingly, a socialist state must prepare to resist such a 
war but not to initiate it (otherwise it, too, would be an imperialist aggressor). Thus China has 
been able to justify its own initiation of hostilities by placing itself in the position of the 
aggrieved party and calling those aggressions 'defensive counterattacks'. Because it does not 
seek conquest, apart from what it regards as its traditional lands (for example, Tibet), it does 
not engage in foreign wars, holds no overseas bases and maintains no forces abroad - apart 
from a few observers and engineers for United Nations' peacekeeping purposes. 
This accords with the traditional Chinese recognition of the superiority of wen (civility) over 
wu (martiality). Wu was only to be resorted to if wen failed and, indeed, wu was believed to 
most effective or 'potent' (10) when it was not dominant over wen. This means that: (a) 'War is 
not easy to glorify because ideally it should never have occurred'; (11) and (b) when war is
used, its effectiveness or potency is dependent on how it related to moral order (is it a just 
war?) and whether it is sparingly used as a means for effecting policy. Here, again, the basic 
framework of yin-yang thinking becomes apparent: The Way or moral order needs to be 
pursued and the method of doing so should be subtle and well-timed rather than brazen. 
The moral-cum-political use of wu, not surprisingly, leaves it open to abuse. For example, there 
is nothing in Confucian philosophy which sanctions the shooting of students; yet the ease with 
which the army could be used to do so in June 1989, under the justification of restoring 
political and social order, attests to the double-edged sword of wu moral power. In practice it 
means that China's rulers - past and present, virtuous or not - had to control the power of wu if 
they wished to be assured of their own. Hence Mao Zedong spoke of power - the party's power 
- growing out of the barrel of a gun. Similarly, Deng Xiaoping was also able to retain supreme 
power through the backing of the army. 
3. Modern Chinese Strategic Philosophy 
The yin-yang orientation in modern Chinese strategic philosophy may be found in the doctrine, 
strategy and concept of people's war. As will be elaborated below, it teaches its practitioners 
first to yield (yin) and later to take the initiative in destroying a weakened adversary through 
offensive warfare (yang). 
Having been hailed as the strategy which brought the Chinese Communists to power in 1949, it 
is understandable that people's war became the PRC's official military doctrine for guiding 
defence policy.(12) As doctrine, it provides the guiding principles for the application of China's 
armed force in both deterrence and war-fighting modes. As a concept, however, it may be 
found among many cultures and throughout history. As I have recounted elsewhere, (13) its 
guerilla component was employed by the ancient Chinese, by Alexander the Great in central 
Asia, by Spanish popular resistance against Napoleon, by the Apaches during the American 
colonisation, by the Arabs against the Turks in 1916-1918, and by European partisans in World 
War II. The use of non-professional combatants and unorthodox combat methods is evident in 
these and numerous other examples, including the Communist Revolution in China, prompting 
the following definitional understanding of people's war: 
A conservative definition of people's war may offer amorphous military forces fighting by unorthodox 
means within a territory that is to be defended against conquest, or reclaimed in the event that the 
invader has established control. A radical definition would include this, essentially military aspect of 
people's war, but would continue in the identification of a significant political component prevalent in 
modern revolutionary warfare. . . . Whether people's war is conservatively or radically defined it may be 
said to display one key characteristic, that of the planned achievement of psychological ascendancy 
which denies the opponent the choice of concepts of how a war is to be waged. The effect is intended to 
be disorienting, demoralising and therefore debilitating. Theoretically this amounts to a powerful psycho-
military determinant of war outcome. (14) 
The psycho-military determinant of war outcome is a distinguishing feature of China's strategic 
thought. It inspired the development of a strategic doctrine to serve the CCP. As developed by 
Mao in the 1930s, people's war is "a doctrine of victory denial by means of 'protracted war' . . . 
Its aim is to erode the adversary's strength by military and psychological attack on weak points 
(attrition warfare), and to secure opponent defeat in a final phase which is marked by decisive 
battle." (15) 
The three phases of traditional people's war are strategic retreat ('luring the enemy in deep'), 
stalemate, and strategic counter-offensive. To the first phase are applied the now famous 
guerilla warfare tactics, summarised by Mao as: "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy 
camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue.' (16) In other 
words, the enemy is denied its concepts of warfare: "You fight in your way and we fight in 
ours; we fight when we can win and move away when we can't." (17) The enemy may enter 
China but it cannot readily locate or identify the forces of resistance who, in turn, exploit their 
own advantages of a large population for providing fighters and support bases, spaces for 
exhausting the enemy, and time for which space is traded. The second stage of the stalemate is 
"the period of the enemy's strategic consolidation and our preparation for the strategic 
offensive", (18) when "guerilla units waging guerilla warfare" are transformed into "regular 
forces waging mobile warfare", thereby altering the balance of force for initiating the third 
phase "of our strategic counter-offensive and the enemy's strategic retreat". (19) 
This three-phased strategy was Mao's answer to the problem of how to overcome an objectively 
stronger opponent. This is a problem of defence which has been a perennial concern for the 
Chinese, as evidenced by the building of the Great Wall, but also in the literature of countless 
generations of Chinese. As Lin Chong-Pin observes: "Wars in which the inferior defenders, 
rather than the superior aggressors, won have been emphasised by historians and romanticized 
by writers." (20) 
The ancient philosopher most readily identified as a defensive strategist is Mo Zi (Mo Tzu). His 
exploits as a volunteer conflict negotiator and defensive tactics adviser are indeed admirable, 
not only for his time, but also as a lesson for conflict management in the current international 
system. Mo Zi deplored war. Given the realities, however, of strong states invading weak states 
(realities which remain with us in the present), this philosopher-engineer saw fit to devise 
defensive war-fighting techniques in the event that peaceful avenues of conflict resolution 
failed. Hence, in his Ethical and Political Works, (21) Mao not only wrote on the 
'Condemnation of Offensive War', but also penned practical advice on seigecraft - for example, 
'Defence against Attack from an Elevation', 'Defence against Attack with Ladders', 'Preparation 
against Inundation', and 'Defence against Tunnelling'. (22) 
Mo Zi, in effect, was following a victory-denial strategy, a vital component of Mao's strategic 
doctrine which holds that should deterrence fail, then defensive war-fighting capabilities in the 
form of a protracted war of resistance should be in place. Knowing this, the enemy should be 
deterred even more so in its intention to wage war, for the costs might well outweigh the 
anticipated benefits. Modern examples of miscalculation were the American forces in Vietnam, 
the Soviets in Afghanistan, and the Vietnamese in Cambodia. All three were denied victory. In 
the first, a peasant army of Vietnamese won a protracted war against one superpower, the USA. 
In the second, Afghan resistance fighters could not be subdued by the world's other 
superpower, the USSR, whose forces eventually had to withdraw. In the third, Vietnamese who 
had subsequently become a dominant power among its Indochinese neighbours, suffered 
protracted resistance to its military presence in Cambodia. It, too, eventually had to withdraw. 
In none of these cases did the intruder achieve victory. All three were met with physical and 
psychological opposition which included the pressure of international opinion. 
Mo Zi is not alone in providing a philosophical antecedent to contemporary victory-denial 
strategy. Mao's own favoured classical reference, The Art of War, a Chinese text ascribed to 
Sun Zi (Sun Tzu) and dated to about 350 BC, states: ". . . the skilful commander takes up a 
position in which he cannot be defeated . . ." (23) Where Mao's strategic thinking differs from 
Mo Zi, but agrees with Sun Zi, is in the interpretation of defensive strategy. Mo Zi was perhaps 
too much of a defensive strategist in his doctrine of 'non-offense' (fei gong) for both Mao's and 
the current leadership's liking. In other words, both traditional and modern people's war 
philosophy hold that victory-denial should not imply a purely defensive strategy; offensive 
operations for a defensive aim are deemed necessary (hence people's war's final phase of the 
strategic counter-offensive). On this point, Sun Zi's statement that "invincibility lies in defence; 
the possibility of victory in the attack" (24) is matched by Mao's ". . . the only real defence is 
active defence, defence for the purpose of counter-attacking and taking the offensive". (25) In 
effect, the object of war is "to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy", but this is not 
unadulterated offensive warfare, for to destroy the enemy means to "deprive him of the power 
to resist" rather than to "destroy every member of his forces physically". (26) Victory-denial 
again becomes evident, but so do 'extramilitary factors' (27) as the preferred means to this end. 
Extramilitary factors include the psychological employment of force, social transformation 
(hearts and minds campaigns), factors of economy, geography and diplomacy, of ethics and 
morality (be it concerned with the ideas of Confucianism or Daoism in the past or of 
ideological integrity in more recent times). A distinctive feature of Chinese strategic culture is 
to hold in even greater esteem the strategist who operates at the extramilitary level to achieve 
the desired objective, than one who is merely good at the physical employment of force for 
political or other objectives - a trait associated with the 'barbarians' of ancient times, just as it is 
with those who are driven by the technological imperative today. The high regard for stratagem 
over physical force was displayed by numerous ancient strategists, including Sun Zi and his 
contemporary Wu Qi whose concern for such extramilitary matters as ethics and the Natural 
Law of Dao occupy the opening chapters of his book on the art of war. (28) As for Sun Zi, he is 
best remembered for the following advice: "To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme 
of skill." Moreover: "He who excels at resolving difficulties does so before they arise. He who 
excels in conquering his enemies triumphs before threats materialise". (29). This is not to say 
that the classical strategists were better at cerebral games than physical battles. Like Mo Zi with 
his instructions of defensive tactics, Wu Qi and Sun Zi and others did not neglect the 
operational and tactical practicalities of warfare. It is simply that, as Edward Boylan expressed 
it, 
Actual fighting is not considered the epitome of skill. The mark of a superior strategist is his ability to 
attack the mind of his opponent . . . The army, if it were actually used at all, was the instrument 
delivering the final blow to an opponent previously made vulnerable. (30) 
So, too, Mao reserved the conventional military mode for the third and final phase of people's 
war, the strategic counter-offensive, to strike an opponent weakened by unconventional means. 
Mao's unconventional means by which an objectively stronger enemy is rendered vulnerable 
are entirely in accord with Sun Zi's injunctions: 
Appear in places to which [the enemy] must hasten; move swiftly where he does not expect you; 
If I am able to determine the enemy's dispositions while at the same time conceal my own then I can 
concentrate and he must divide; 
The enemy must not know where I intend to give battle . . . And when he prepares in a great many 
places, those I have to fight in any one place will be few. (31) 
On the question of how one is to employ a people's war strategy in this high-tech military age, 
it is noteworthy that Mao called for flexibility to changing circumstances, without sacrificing 
one's guiding strategic principles. (32) In his own time he did this when calling the American 
atom bomb a 'paper tiger'. He did not underestimate the power of the weapon, and indeed saw 
to that China adapted to changing circumstance - the modern conditions of the post-World War 
II era - by developing its own nuclear weapons. It was at the strategic level that he ridiculed 
such power because it was morally questionable, it was "divorced from the people". (33) Here 
may be found yet another echo from a strategic tradition that begins books on war with issues 
of ethics, social morale, and other extramilitary factors. This highlights the man-over-weapons 
concept, so prevalent in China's past (since Mencius) and present (for instance, the Handbook 
of Military Knowledge for Commanders (34) contains the sub-heading, 'Despise the Enemy 
Strategically and Respect the Enemy Tactically'.) The psychomilitary determinant of war 
outcome, as distinct from the techno-military one, is essentially a re-statement of the classical 
position that "the human factor is more decisive than material factors". (35) 
What would happen, though, if China were forced to face the test of technology? This is not an 
unreasonable question even if the threat from the north has been removed with the end of the 
Cold War and the collapse of the USSR. Russia and China have a long history of rivalry across 
the Eurasian landmass. Both are proud countries. Russia still occupies territory which China 
lost in the colonial era of 'unequal treaties'. It was a time when China was too weak to resist the 
imposition of European treaties. A century later, China has strengthened considerably, It has 
the world's largest armed force, possesses a credible nuclear deterrent with land, air and sea 
basing modes, and is revitalising its economy to the point where its annual growth rates are 
among the world's highest. A strengthened China might be seen as posing a threat to Russian 
interests in its Far East, especially if that region eventually secures independence from Moscow 
and falls within the economically more progressive Chinese sphere. There is also the United 
States to consider. Chinese plans to counter US forces in possible conflict scenarios - such as 
over Taiwan, in Korea, and as a result of sovereignty claims in the South China Sea - are an 
open secret. (36) These presuppose the failure of resolving conflict, to China's satisfaction by 
other (wen) means. So what does application of the wu mode mean in the contemporary world? 
Modern military conditions include advanced technology weapons and methods of use, such as 
combined services and combined arms operations, the blitzkrieg or 'lightening war' method, and 
the presence of weapons of mass destruction, be they nuclear, chemical or biological. Modern 
conditions also include electronic communication and interceptions systems, ranging from the 
military application of satellites to battle command and control uses. Even before the 
demonstration of the efficacy of advanced technology in the Gulf War, the Chinese were well 
aware of the effect of these altered material conditions, and in their defence modernisation 
program they have studied closely problems of modern conditions. As a result, there is 
modernisation and professionalisation of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), a policy 
continued even after the 1989 crackdown when it was believed that politics would overtake 
professionalism. (37) Not only was China able to take advantage of the sale of comparatively 
sophisticated ex-Soviet equipment at low prices in the aftermath of the Col War, but it was also
given greater incentive to concentrate on the acquisition of more and better technology by the 
lessons of the Gulf War. It was a war which indicated that the world's remaining superpower 
was able to inflict punishment successfully by virtue of its mastery of advanced technology. As 
one Chinese commentator stated: "The Gulf War taught China some lessons and showed what 
sophisticated weaponry can do." (38) Another echoed the sentiment in Beijing when he 
observed: "America as the only superpower still wants to dominate the world . . ." (39) Indeed, 
in early 1993, the general secretary of the CCP, Jiang Zemin, advised that the persistence of 
"power politics and hegemonism" in the post-Cold War world required China to improve its 
defence through technological advances. (40) China, it must be remembered, acquired nuclear 
weapons technology to strengthen its defence in the Cold War. It is reasonable to assume that it 
will continue to do whatever it deems necessary to deter potential adversaries in the post-Cold 
War period. 
However, just as the PRC's decision to develop its own nuclear arsenal did not entail reversing 
the preferred order of human or psychological factors over material or technological ones, so 
too it is not necessarily the case that the present leadership will do so. If nuclear power as the 
ultimate instrument of physical force did not budge centuries of wen dominance over wu, why 
should any lesser occurrences since then - like the spectacle of Operation Desert Storm -
change the Chinese strategic mind? 
Certainly in any future war, the Chinese are not likely to abandon urban-industrial centres in a 
territory-yielding exercise, nor are they likely to remain passive in what they call the early 
stages of war. They may well detonate tactical nuclear weapons in a guerilla fighting mode 
which avoids confrontational counter-attacks. This inferred aspect of modern people's war I 
have termed guerilla nuclear warfare (GNW) and defined it as "the use of guerilla methods 
within a protracted nuclear war fought at the theatre level". (41) GNW could represent the 
future direction for Chinese nuclear strategy, in service of the strategic need for inviolability. 
To better understand how the modern nuclear condition may be made to serve the traditional 
values of moral and psychological superiority, closer scrutiny of the concept of deterrence is 
required. 
"Deterrence" is the commonly employed Western strategic term for the defensive, yin, facet of 
strategy. It entails building the capability to resist invasion and communicating the will to use 
this capability in order to dissuade a potential opponent from embarking on a course of action 
deemed harmful to oneself. Deterrence is psychological. You create physical force not for use 
on the physical battlefield but for use on the mental one. If physical force is used on the 
physical battlefield it has failed on the mental one. This, of course, is the rational for having 
nuclear weapons: their 'use' is in their 'non-use'' if nuclear weapons are used physically they 
have failed in their primary purpose of deterrence. If the opponent, however, knows you do not 
intend to use your weapons physically, then the deterrent is almost sure to fail. This requires an 
exhibition of 'intention' as well as 'capability' if one is to succeed in one's deterrent posture: the 
opponent must be convinced that you are indeed prepared to employ your weapons physically 
and that you are not merely making empty threats. In other words, your threat must be 
'credible'. (42) 
The whole problem of credibility is one with which China had to deal during the nuclear age of 
1947 to 1989. Obviously, Chinese nuclear force fell far short of either superpower's forces in 
size and sophistication. Accounting for only three percent of the world's total warheads and 
holding only a tenth the number of launchers of either superpower, the Chinese had no 
intention of competing with the mega arsenals of the Soviets and Americans. They were filling 
the gaps in the people's war deterrent caused by changes in modern warfare. Until the 1980s, 
China's nuclear weapons were confined to land and air delivery systems. With the addition of 
ballistic and cruise missile submarines, they were fulfilling the contemporary demands of their 
total, unified, deterrence concept. This reveals a strategic culture which, like its political 
culture, refers to internal guidance for changing external conditions. The aim is not to imitate 
that which is new or foreign, and thereby attempt to become it, but to incorporate or 'civilize' it 
into an existing system. This is what happened to the Mongol and Manchu conquerors of 
China, and to concepts of Communism and Capitalism. The addition of the term 'Chinese 
characteristics' signifies the age-old practice of sinicising that which is new and foreign. So, 
too, with matters pertaining to defence. In the Chinese cosmology, it is not the fragmentary 
worlds of nuclear, conventional, army, navy, airforce or industry that count, but how they 
connect to form the total deterrent force. In this regard it is worth noting that the People's 
Liberation Army is not just an army but includes all services, having at its disposal nuclear and 
conventional weaponry, plus multi-billion dollar business interests that 'supplement' its 
government budgetary allowance. In additional to all this, it has a political role to remind it of 
its 'proper purpose' - even if its actions are, on occasion (June 1989), improper. That the PLA 
has not changed its political name is surely significant. An increase in the level of 
specialization, like the introduction of an elite rapid deployment force, shows that the PLA 
finds it possible to be both political and professional. 
Within this cosmology, there is a responsiveness to circumstance rather than a reordering of the 
system: thus the circumstance of peripheral or local war, such as a punitive expedition, calls for 
force characteristics notably different to one of general war against all-out invasion. It does not 
call for a new philosophical system upon which to base action. Western analysts need to be 
careful not to confuse system with circumstance when analysing Chinese military thinking.
Hence the acquisition of nuclear weapons enhanced the people's war deterrent, rather than 
having created a separate one based on technology. Whilst the details of how the doctrine of 
modern people's war translates into battlefield practice have never been clear, they may 
nonetheless be inferred. Credibility is sought through "the power to force inaction by 
frightening", (43) which is how the concept of deterrence may be translated literally in Chinese. 
The achievement of this power tactically returned to the function of GNW, for possible use on 
Chinese territory by Chinese forces. Below I quote two paragraphs from my book which best 
capture the essence of how a future people's war may employ the psychology of deterrence -
the power to force inaction by frightening. 
Even if guerilla nuclear war is a deterrent strategy which presupposed the failure of the overall Chinese 
deterrent, in that it cannot operate before China's territorial integrity is violated, yet what is created by 
the addition of GNW is a multi-layered deterrent, in which the failure of the first element is not . . . a 
terminal issue. If the Chinese can accept the costs of GNW to themselves then it seems certain that 
they can render the costs of GNW unacceptable to the enemy and hence succeed in their objective. 
Guerilla nuclear warfare as the culmination of people's war under modern conditions, represents China's 
mastery of strategic-military survival in the twenty-first century. When a potential aggressor is deterred 
from provoking GNW it can be truly said that 'a victorious army wins its victories before seeking 
battle' [Sun Zi]; but should GNW as a deterrent strategy fail, then it will prevail as an effective defence. 
An invader that 'fights in the hope of winning', under these terms of protracted warfare, is 'an army 
destined to defeat' [Sun Zi]. (44) 
The 'use' of GNW in the event that its 'non-use' has failed, recalls the Daoist concept of 
judicious balance between 'use' and 'non-use', (45) as well as the aforementioned concept of
martial potency. The latter suggests wu power can be awe-inspiring and hold terror only if it is 
originally intended as belonging to the sphere of 'non-use' - "wu as latency", as distinct from 
"wu in constant prominence". (46) Should 'non-use' fail, and to help prevent it failing because 
of lack of credibility, 'use' becomes 'thinkable', as Herman Kahn has phrased it (47). What is so 
persuasive about such hypothetical use? According to Daoist thought, its persuasiveness rests in 
its invisibility (it can be everywhere and nowhere) and in its selectivity. '[M]artial force has its 
greatest effect when applied at selected chi.' (48) The psycho-military equivalent of the Chinese 
concept of chi or 'energy' has been articulated by Mao Zedong in his formulation of guerilla 
war. Once hostilities begin, the threat or even enactment of GNW becomes an attacker's 
nightmare, combining as it does (a) protracted war (which traditionally benefits the defence) 
and (b) the 'unthinkable' end of the military spectrum. 
If this seems remote, consider that at the end of a tactical nuclear exercise in 1982, a Chinese 
strategist was reported to have been in favour of altering China's promise never to be the first to 
use nuclear weapons. He would qualify this pledge by adding the words 'on foreign territory'. 
(49) The idea of use on Chinese territory is not new. During the Formosa Crisis of 1958, Mao is 
said to have suggested using Soviet nuclear weapons on Chinese soil against American troops, 
who would have been lured into the interior in typical people's war fashion. (50) Fortunately, 
his proposal was resisted by the Soviets. But that Mao was capable of thinking along these lines 
is further evidenced from his statement of resolve: that China was prepared to sacrifice up to 
500 million of its people. (51) Even if this is pure rhetoric, who would wish to test such 
resolve? In the end, the effect is psychological, as it had to be in the nuclear-dominated world 
which China did not create but against which it was determined to survive. Never again would 
it be at the mercy of technologically superior powers, as it had been at the end of its dynastic 
life. Another pledge: Never will China be the first to use nuclear weapons. Which is stronger? 
Fiction is. This is illustrated by adapting a dialogue of the Daoist master, Zhuang Zi (Chuang-
Tzu), to explain GNW: 
"If guerilla nuclear warfare's intention is to be useless, why does it serve on the altar for the defence of 
the land?" 
"Be still and do not declare a doctrine. GNW just pretends to be on the altar. By so doing it can protect 
us from the injury of those who do not know it is useless. If it were not on the altar, we would be still in 
danger from the arrogance of those with nuclear teeth. Moreover, what this doctrine maintains is 
different from what ordinary military doctrines do. Therefore, to judge it with conventional morality is far 
from the point." 
"All know the usefulness of the useful, but not that of the useless." (52) 
4. The Power of Ideas 
Whilst paper tigers with nuclear teeth are held at bay, China must still address the threat of 
something more akin to its own notion of true power - that is, the power of ideas. In recent 
time, the internal environment erupted with civil rebellion - specifically in Tibet and Beijing -
on a scale sufficient to provoke a military response. Consequently there is a renewed 
appreciation of the internal environment as a determinant of defence planning. 
Thus, if harm were to come China's way, it could now do so in the form of ideas, which, in 
challenging the ruling party's legitimacy, can affect internal cohesion; and it could come from 
the weight of international opinion which is capable of adversely affecting China's access to 
foreign technology - a necessary ingredient for its modernisation drive. China's presumed desire 
to create a situation which is unassailable now refers less to physical invasion and more to the 
invasion of undesirable influences, or 'spiritual pollution' (to use the Chinese Communistic 
term). Examples of corruption among those holding responsible positions are legion. The 
authorities have blamed 'money worship' for these ills. Analysts in the West blame the absence 
of institutional control in a society which emphasises rule by man rather than rule by law. ". . . 
the West has institutions and laws designed to constrain greed within socially-useful bounds; 
China does not. The get-rich-quick ethos encouraged under Deng has generated a tidal wave of 
corruption which now threatens the integrity of the Communist Party itself." (53) Where, one 
might ask of economically driven China, are the self-effacing ideals of Confucius and Lei Feng, 
(54) the attitudinal requirements for maintaining the 'correct' relationship between ruler and 
ruled? Without them, according to the perception of history which informs Chinese strategic 
culture, chaos or luan befalls a nation. 
Like most other countries, China regards internal cohesion as a vital element of security. How 
to maintain internal cohesion is often determined by political culture. In China's case, there has 
long been a dialectical relationship between centralisation and decentralisation, orthodoxy and 
reform, morality and expediency. From ancient times, China practised a mixture of idealism 
and classical realism, represented by Confucianism on the one hand and Legalism on the other. 
Similarly, its history has been punctuated by periods of unity and disunity. The commonly held 
fear that the loss of central control will lead to 'warlordism' is to a large extent based on this 
pattern of experience. David Bonavia's biography of Deng notes that "in his 1983 critique of 
Party organisation, [Deng] said excessive decentralisation was caused by excessive 
centralisation in the past, concentration of power in the hands of a few people, and the remnants 
of 'feudal despotism'". (55) Indeed, under Deng the post of party chairman, which Mao had 
held, was abolished, and the cult of personality was discouraged. 
Yet Deng himself was to become a legend in his own time. Having shed all official titles, he 
remained China's most powerful man. Routinely hailed by the foreign press as China's 
paramount leader, Deng would on occasion demonstrate his authority. For example, early in 
1992 when it was decided that the post-1989 ideological revival could now safely be allowed to 
subside, the 'paramount leader' appeared in the prospering southern regions, including the 
Special Economic Zone of Shenzhen, full of praise for their achievements. (56) Predicably, 
economic reform once again resumed its dominant place in Chinese domestic policy. Not only 
does this incident illustrate the power of one man - and one without any formal position - it also 
exemplifies the dialectical relationship between orthodoxy and reform. This, of course, goes 
back to classical as well as the more recent pre-Communist times. It was notable, for instance, 
during the 19th century when enfeebled Imperial China failed to heed the advice of the 'self-
strengthening' movement. Idealism and realism are also linked to this condition. Deng and his 
fellow-reformers have concluded that capitalist means are necessary for achieving socialist 
ends. It is acceptable to use the one in order to advance the other. 
If confusion should arise as to how China can be socialist if it practises capitalism or how 
capitalist practices can be championed by a Communist government, one need only be 
reminded of the method of appending 'Chinese characteristics' to Western concepts. 'Chinese 
characteristics' may not be self-explanatory or explain how they affect borrowed concepts. The
phrase is meaningful, however, when it is suggestive of the enormous capacity in Chinese 
thought to incorporate polarities and in Chinese language to allow for flexibility. Leaving 
something unsaid - or open to interpretation - is part of the dynamic of Chinese language and 
thought. To use George W. Kent's summation: "Sinitic thought is, before anything else, 
dialectical thought." (58) He cites the culture-counterculture relationship of Confucianists and 
Taoists, as well as philosophical contradistinction to both by the Legalist school of materialists. 
(59) The results of this dialectic have been aptly expressed as follows: "The Legalist victory, 
while seeming to destroy Confucianism, in reality created a stable society in which it could 
triumph. The Confucian victory, far from destroying Legalism, made the Legalist empire all but 
indestructible." (60) 
Perhaps Mackerras takes up the contemporary spirit of such interactive enterprise when he 
concludes: "It is very likely that socialism with Chinese characteristics will turn out to be very 
similar to capitalism with Confucian characteristics". (61) Closer to the image of things foreign 
being incorporated into 'Chineseness' or 'Sinism', rather than Chinese characteristics being an 
appendage, is the notion of Sinism with a capitalist 'strategic counter-offensive', as the 
subsequent yang-like development of "Sinism behind a Marxist-Leninist shield". (62) Besides 
reversing the order so that the Chinese component resumes its 'rightful place', there is an 
imputation here that even the socialist 'ends' (that capitalism is supposed to serve) are not 
Marxist-Leninist ones, but the more familiar socialism found in traditional Chinese idealism. 
So how does the heritage of the past continue to serve present efforts towards inviolability? The 
quest for inviolability, as proposed in this paper, refers to the negative or yin facet of Chinese 
strategic philosophy. The attainment of China's 'rightful place under heaven' represents the 
positive or yang aspect of the strategic orientation. China, if it is to meet the power of these 
ideas cannot remain defensive. (63) The US leadership understood this when confronted by 
Gorbachev's 'new thinking'. By moving with Gorbachev, rather than opposing him, the Cold 
War became redundant and the USA was in a position to herald a subsequent powerful idea, 
that of the 'new world order'. As it turned out, this fresh agenda stalled and the idea of the new 
world order could not sustain credibility. It did serve to spur on China, however. Under Bush's 
new world order China saw itself as decidedly disadvantaged. Gone was the triangular 
relationship among the two competing superpowers and an 'equidistant' PRC which would 'tilt' 
from one to the other as changing strategic circumstances dictated. 
With the peaceful resolution of the Cold War, it became clear that unless China, too, acted in 
the expansive (or active) yang mode, it was doomed to lose the psychological initiative in 
world affairs. In 1989 it failed on the psychological battlefield (internationally in the short term 
and probably internally in the longer term) when it resorted to physical force in Beijing. 
According to strategic tradition, including Mao's traditional people's war, one does not embark 
on a counter-offensive unless one is assured of victory. And victory cannot be assured unless 
the enemy has been weakened first by other means. Thus defensive warfare must be correctly 
employed, after which the offensive defence - or active defence - must be initiated. I do not 
presume to predict the way in which China will continue to deal with the pro-democracy ideas 
that have swept the international arena in recent time, or the way in which it will harmonise the 
issue of internal relations with Tibet, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. I will, however, call upon the 
traditional Chinese philosophy of Daoism to provide a possible context for forming, at least my 
own, thoughts on this problem. 
At a more fundamental level, Daoists have phrased the problem in terms of "how to preserve 
life and avoid harm and danger in the human world". (64) They have provided an answer in the 
form of adhering to the Dao (the Way). There are three stages in Daoist development. (65) The 
first is to retreat from the human world in order to reside in the natural world where the 
principles of the Dao may be experienced. This first stage, in effect, entails becoming a hermit. 
The important point here is that retreat in the wilds does not, in itself, qualify one as a Daoist. 
The action or retreat must be accompanied by an ideological justification for doing so. A 
parallel in the modern political world may be found in the 'hermit kingdom; of Communist 
North Korea and in the PRC's almost autarkic life prior to its 'open door' policy as of the late 
1970s. Interestingly, when faced with difficulties in its relations with Washington, Beijing 
simply stated that it was not afraid to be isolated again. For example, this was said in the early 
1980s when Deng Xiaoping denounced Washington's policy of supplying weapons to Taiwan. 
(66) Again, as a result of American-led Western censure over the Chinese leadership's handling 
of internal protest in 1989, the Chinese response included the threat that: 
. . . if the United States continues to overemphasise the ideological differences between itself and 
China, China will react strongly and tighten "ideological control" severely and, in the worst possible 
scenario, close its door and abandon its policy of reform and opening to the rest of the world. (67) 
Such a threat - and its converse, the promise of a stable and prospering China being to the 
world's benefit - must have been sufficiently credible to persuade the West to keep the 
communication channels open with China. More recently, in March 1994, Premier Li Peng told 
visiting US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, that if the US withdrew Most Favoured 
Nation status to China because of perceived human rights problems, "the losses incurred by the 
United States would be no smaller than those to China" and that China has "a strong capability 
of self-reliance". (68) 
In the cases of both North Korea and China, there is a strong ideological justification for retreat 
into isolation from the international arena. Of course, in practical and philosophical terms, it is 
not feasible for China to become isolated again. Adequately feeding, let alone improving the 
lives of a billion people, requires China to be part of the international economic system. 
Politically, too, it is dangerous to deprive the Chinese people of the expectation of improved 
living standards, especially now that they have begun to enjoy some of the benefits of 
economic reform. Above all, from the philosophical perspective being investigated here, there 
is recognition that retreat is not sufficient. This is shown by the second stage of Daoist 
development (elaborated below). However, it is also within the character of second stage 
Daoism to employ such stratagems as the threat of disengagement in order to achieve one's 
goals. This intention is evident in the document (Neican Xuanpian) circulated internally among 
the leadership. It stated the Tiananmen incident was not likely to cause a serious rift in Sino-US 
relations because of a number of fears held by the Americans. One of these fears was "that 
China would be forced into isolation and hostility towards the West". (69) 
So the first stage of retreat is understood to be a saving mechanism against the dangers of the 
ideologically corrupt human world. The need for a second stage derives from the inadequacies 
of retreat. "Things in the human world . . . are so complicated that no matter how well one hides 
oneself, there are always evils to be avoided." (70) In strategic terms, avoidance behaviour is 
not enough to ensure inviolability, let alone the acquisition of one's 'rightful place under 
heaven'. With this in mind, one may develop from the first stage of retreat to the second stage 
of return. Armed with an understanding of Daoist principles, "the laws underlying the changes 
of things" (71), it is then possible to employ such understanding when seeking survival - and 
indeed advantage - in one's dealings with the human world. In Fung Yu-Lan's words: "Things 
change but the laws underlying the changes remain unchanging. If one understands these laws 
and regulates one's action in conformity with them, one can then turn everything to one's 
advantage." (72) The 'use' of Dao in this way means that one is still affected by worldly 
concerns. While it may be the appropriate stage for the conduct of a nation-state's international 
affairs, given the present evolution of the international political system, philosophically the 
quest for advantage represents an incomplete development. Internationally, too, the strategic 
application represented by phase two is no guarantee against misfortune but a method of 
minimising its risks. 
Hence the third and most desirable stage of development, from the Daoist philosophical 
perspective, is to attain a state of mind which is not perturbed by the fortunes or misfortunes of 
worldly affairs. (73) Such equanimity comes from appreciating the principles of Dao rather 
than using it strategically or, in the initial stage, escaping from the world's fiction. Fung 
proposes the idea of transcendence to describe the third stage: 
By seeing things from [the] higher point of view, one can transcend the existing world. This is also a 
form of "escape"; not one however, from society to mountains and forests, but rather from this world to
another world. Here is the third and last phase of development in the Taoism [Daoism] of ancient times. 
(74) 
While this final phase may be outside the domain of international relations, it is not entirely 
irrelevant. If stage one is retreat from harm, which can only be effective under particular 
circumstances for limited time, and stage two is employment of the Dao strategically in the 
current world of complex interdependence, then stage three suggests a utopian model of 
international relations to which we have not arrived but which is nonetheless envisaged in the 
writings of political idealists. While it would be extraordinarily difficult to attain this stage in 
international affairs without deep structural changes in the world system, aspiration remains a 
viable force in the conduct of present-day affairs. As stated earlier, aspiration can be viewed in 
terms of not courting disappointment but purpose. When China condemned both the 
superpowers as "the source of the world's ills" because of their "fierce contention . . for 
hegemony", (75) it was being critical of the way in which the world was being run. Such a 
critical view of the status quo invested China's own foreign policy with a purpose which sought 
to transcend the international ethos of 'might is right'. That the rule of international law was 
invoked in the recent Gulf Crisis, and used to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait, shows that the 
international community was at least seen to be doing more to promote what is perceived to be 
'right' over 'might'. Later, of course, the Gulf episode was criticised by many as illustrative of 
the 'might' of the US to affirm its 'right' to Arab oil. Nonetheless, such cooperative behaviour 
followed the end of the Cold War - the end of the "fierce contention of the two superpowers for 
hegemony". The end of this state of affairs was, in turn, propelled by the above-mentioned 'new 
thinking' in the then Soviet Union. This was the second time this century that the Russians were 
propagators of a new thinking to influence the course of international history. 
With the end of the Cold War, however, and the retreat of the Russians on the eve of their 
empire's imminent disintegration, there loomed the unresolved question as to whose interests 
the so-called 'new world order' was really serving. That the US President, George Bush, should 
have made it a catchcry attracted suspicion, just as Gorbachev's 'glasnost' was regarded initially 
as a clever trick by the Russian bear disguised in Western dress. So too, a post-Gulf War 
scepticism settled over the 'new world order' of George Bush. The story runs along the 
following lines. With the US-led allied victory over Iraq in the first major hot war after the end
of the Cold War, there emerged one discernible superpower with the law on its side. That is to 
say, the rule of international law, enforced by predominantly US military means, might provide 
a case of the USA consolidating its own 'right place under the international heaven'. If the USA 
is a hawk (or pie-bald eagle, to be precise) disguised as a dove, then there is nothing 'rightful' -
or virtuous - about the USA's 'place' in the international moral order. According to the Chinese 
yardstick, this is because of the ideologically suspect condition of playing superpower. The 
Chinese continue to caution the world against large powers dominating UN operations in the 
post-Cold War era. (76) 
It is perhaps instructive that one man's unbridled vision led to self-destruction - more 
accurately, the destruction of Russia's Soviet incarnation - while the other's expedient 'new 
world order' led eventually to a loss of both credibility and 'face'. The US could not sustain its 
heroic role in either the Balkans or Somalia. In the former, it would not become involved. The 
'new world order', therefore, could tolerate barbarism in Europe, the fount of Western 
civilization. Meanwhile, in Africa, US involvement was humiliating. How many Americans 
and 'American-watchers' could forget the graphic television coverage of the Somali degradation 
ceremony inflicted on the US through treatment of its dead and captured soldiers? Yet could 
this merely be a symptom, like failure in the Vietnam War, of US foreign policy suffering from 
moral over-reach? In other words, the costs of imposing a 'new world order' (American 
casualties and humiliation) are not worth the benefits (American moral and military leadership 
as implied by the post-Gulf War epithet, 'global cop')? If the lesson here is that US expediency
cannot be isolated from a moral rendering of emerging international realities, likewise, was not 
Gorbachev's visionary 'new thinking' remembered primarily as a foreign policy coup? 
Politically, (77) it represented a brilliant strategic move to take the initiative away from the 
Americans. Gorbachev's diplomatic initiative came without the exorbitant expenditure required 
by the American Strategic Defence Initiative and was achieved by a hearts-and-minds 
campaign launched at a susceptible period in international life. Effectively, the Soviet 
leadership set about wooing international opinion with the promise of that which could only be 
regarded as a 'new world order'. The Americans were eventually to articulate this sentiment, 
thereby regaining the initiative in global affairs. 
What does this cycle suggest? Two readings may be offered. One is that it displays the yin-
yang characteristics of passive-active modes. Thus the Americans acted in accordance with the 
Dao of prevailing international relations by not opposing the Gorbachev diplomatic initiative, 
but flowing with it so that they could achieve their own 'yang'. Subsequently this was to subside 
into yet another yin phase of either comparative non-achievement or seed-sowing measures like 
hosting the APEC meeting and extending NAFTA membership. (78) The other reading is the 
way in which principles and pragmatism, idealism and realism, interact. Gorbachev's 'new 
thinking' went beyond being a politically astute response to international circumstances. Thus it 
went beyond phase two Daoism. It could be credited with taking on a proactive character in 
shaping international life. This indicates a higher order of activity than that of strategic 
manoeuvre. Phase three Daoism was invoked. As one Western analyst explained it: 
Contradicting the Marxist-Leninist view of social reality as most fundamentally conflictual, new thinking 
claims that the most fundamental reality is the underlying unity of the world. In contrast to the 
fundamental emphasis on the interests of the proletariat, new thinking proposes a moral order based on 
all human or universal values. Dismissing the belief that social evolution will inevitably lead all nations to 
socialism, new thinking claims that evolution is spawning more diverse social forms but at the same time 
pressing these diverse forms towards greater harmony and integration. (79) 
Indeed, the official Soviet view could not be clearer when it stated that: "The struggle between 
opposite systems is no longer a determining tendency of the present-day era." (80) 
If there was any attempt to bring about a genuine 'new world order' via the power of new 
thinking, then the Dao of international relations would have been well served. That is to say, 
the higher view of global security would then have become operative. Here security becomes 
defined in global terms rather than, and transcending, nation-state terms. Furthermore the very 
notion of security has been broadened and deepened to incorporate concepts of comprehensive 
and interactive security. This means that security is derived not from one or two key strands of 
measurable power, these being military and economic, but from many extramilitary strands 
which incorporate the involvement of other parties. (81) 
Ancient Chinese perspectives are familiar with such an aspiration in international politics. (82) 
There was the idea of international law called li or 'proper conduct to be observed in interstate 
affairs; and there was also the concept of unity, achieved in China in 221 BC. Admittedly this 
was the Chinese empire's unity rather than world unity, but for the Chinese of the time such 
unity did represent the world - 'all beneath the sky'. The object of unity philosophically derived 
from the aspiration for peace. On this point, it has been observed that: 
Though the First Emperor was thus the first to achieve actual unity, the desire for such unity had been 
cherished by all people for a long time previous. In the Mencius we are told that king Hui of Liang asked: 
"How may the world be at peace?" To which Mencius replied: "When there is unity, there will be peace." 
"But who can unify the world?" asked the King. "He who does not delight in killing men can unity it," 
answered Mencius. (Ia, 6) This statement clearly expresses the aspiration of the time (83) 
  
5. Conclusion 
What does the inquiry of this paper tell us about China's future directions? While it is not difficult to
trace China's strategic culture unto the concept of modern people's war, or even to infer the
development of nuclear strategy with this orientation, the way in which China will deal with the
power of ideas cannot be so easily inferred. At the beginning of the paper, 'destiny' is given as a
Western approximation for 'rightful place under heaven'. The inadequacy of this approximation now
becomes evident. It would be more appropriate to say, 'destiny by moral choice'. To date, China has
displayed this characteristic of the pursuit of 'destiny by moral choice'. The unfortunate events of 4
June 1989 would have to be regarded as an exception rather than the norm, though an 'exception' of
Legalist lineage in a China which has always sought to underpin its morality with a foundation of
decisive (if, at times, misdirected) strength. (By analogy, in the martial arts fighting is avoided, but if
it must be engaged in then the blow has to be decisive.) If one is to follow the line of thought which
holds that there is a moral compass in modern Chinese strategic philosophy, then the Dao of
contemporary international politics was pioneered not by the new thinking of the superpowers, but by
China via its independent foreign policy. Plainly, it did not approve of the way in which the rest of the
world, including itself, was being treated - that is, as an arena of contest between the two strongest
nations. China was the only Third World nation strong enough to challenge the new post-1945 world 
order of superpower dominance. It was, and stubbornly remains, an international critic. 
Until the 1990s, inviolability might have been served by nuclear teeth and the attitude that: "Nothing
in the world is to be feared, but there are men who scare themselves." (84) It was apparent then that
China did have a sense of rightful place. In the present decade, spurred by an international climate
more sensitive to the conduct of li, China will be in a better position to occupy its right place. (85)
Though ironic in view of China's reputation of human rights violations, the judgement is still valid in
that the human rights campaign against China affords it an opportunity to elaborate its own
worldview. After all, the Soviet Union broached the third phase of Daoism in the face of challenge,
internal and external. A similar occasion for transformation may now face China. This means that the
positive or yang aspect of the strategic orientation would come into full play now that the era of
defensive play is almost spent. 
Just as the success of the Chinese Revolution of 1949 inspired others in the world who struggled to
free themselves from the prevailing ethos of the 'old world order', so too a revolutionary stance in
promoting an ethically-driven 'new world system' might well be the Chinese-led contribution to the 
global politics of the 21st century. The only caveat is that in doing so China does not meet with the
fate of the former Soviet Union in which change is accompanied by chaos. Deng Xiaoping's
economic reforms are in this instance the safety harness against possible upheaval and the costs (for
China and the West alike) of dependence on Western aid. More than that, stability in China is now a
determinant of global stability. The unity of all beneath the international sky has never quite been so
apparent as in the post-Cold War era of pronounced economic and ecological interdependence. 
Morality in foreign policy is, paradoxically, and to employ a Deng quote, the truth that can be gleaned
from the facts. In this respect, idealism is realism. That Chinese strategic culture has not only coped
with this idea but prospered from it suggests its continued relevance to China's future. 
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